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Reflections On Arab Racism In The Sudan In Light Of The First WCAR. By: Dr. Festo Kumba
A View of Sudan from Africa: Monthly Briefing July 2001
The Foreign Minister of Sudan: Envoy of Hatred
POST-CONFLICT CONFERENCE By: David Mayo
No To Sudan Blood oil
The Military Situation in the Oil Regions of Southern Sudan
Pact of Umar (7th Century)The Status of Non-Muslims Under Muslim Rule
Sudan builds new weapons factories with Chinese help
War and Genocide in the Sudan By: Sabit Alley
Reflections On Arab Racism In The Sudan In Light Of The First WCAR August 22nd 2001.
In a few days, there will be held in Durban, South Africa, the first world conference on racism, slavry and discrimination. African governments are already demanding, and rightly so, that all aspects and expressions of racism be addressed at the conference including the issue of reparations for slavery.
The world conference on racism could not have come at a more opportune time. Few weeks ago, African governments and civil societies around the continent celebrated, with much fanfare, the launching of the African Union, a new socio-political and economic arrangement, intended to usher Africa out of poverty and backwardness into a new era of prosperity. The African Union will, among other things, strengthen mechanisms that ensure that Africans, especially members of the black race, will never again be subjugated to slavery and colonialism, two of the most dehumanizing facets of racism.
The whole of Africa and all Africans in Diaspora are hoping that the African Union, unlike its predecessor, the OAU, will not end in failure and disillusionment. Many reasons individually and collectively contributed to the failures of the OAU. This is not the place to critically discuss these reasons, but for the purpose of the reflections below, attention is here drawn to only one of these reasons often considered as one of the most important.
An item in the OAU charter that was strictly respected and adhered to, in fact almost the only that was so treated, is that concerning respect for the national sovereignty of member countries. In practice, however, dictatorial systems that ruled most of the continent during the entire second half of the last century took advantage of this item in the charter to do exactly as they pleased with the inhabitants of their respective countries.
It is probable that, during this period, many more Africans perished at the hands of their own governments than all those killed or captured into slavery during the many centuries of slave trade and the subsequent colonization. What is astounding is that, during this period, most Africans tended to turn a blind eye to atrocities committed across their boarders. Governments hid behind the OAU charter claiming respect for the "non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries'" policy. Civil society, which could have played its rightful role to minimize atrocities in Africa, was everywhere terrorized into passiveness and even connivance in the oppression of citizens.
Given the above state of affairs, Africa could never have emerged as a strong and vibrant economic and political power within the global context. No wonder therefore, the years following the independence of most African countries saw the whole continent slip slowly into poverty and indebtedness. The whole of Africa became more vulnerable to all forms of external aggression than ever before. Consequence, the black person, everywhere, was more and more relegated to an inferior and peripheral position within human society. In many instances, Africans themselves failed to give each other the dignity and respect they deserved. As we shall see later, in certain countries like the Sudan, even slavery was reintroduced after independence and practiced with impunity.
Today, Africans the world over, strongly believe that the African Union will seriously review and give a more pragmatic re-interpretation to the issue of non-interference in the internal affairs of member countries. It is hoped that the union will provide guidelines that national governments must respect in so far as the treatment of their citizenry is concerned, short of which the concept of national sovereignty cannot remain sacrosanct.
Specified forms of intervention in the affairs of individual member nations need to be defined which could be collectively undertaken by members' nations to stop abuses perpetuated in member's countries. On the other hand, civil society in Africa must assert itself and play its rightful role in addressing the continent's intimate problems no matter in which member country they occur. Africa will do best to start addressing issues of racism, slavery and other abuses at home before it can expect the world to do the same towards the Africans.
Few countries have endured home brewed forms of racism, slavery and human right abuses for as long as the Sudan. State sponsored slavery and racism continues in the Sudan to this day. The Arabs preyed on African societies for slaves in the Sudan since the conquest of the country by Islamic warriors (Mujahideen) in the 7th century following the death of Prophet Mohammed. Today, Arab militiamen, sponsored by the government, often conduct raiding expeditions into the African regions of the Sudan, capturing men, women and children who are sold as slaves to the various Arab nomadic clans who roam the vast territories in the Sahara. In addition, the Black majority in the country is utterly denied basic rights as citizens.
The country was declare an Arab country immediately after independence in 1955 and incorporate into membership of the Arab League against the wishes of its majority black populations. Since 1989 an Arab dominated Islamic fundamentalist regime took over power by force, declared the country an Islamic state guided by the Islamic constitution and enforced strict Islamic law (sharia) all over the country. All these are tactical moves by the minority Arabs who control political, economic and military power in the country to alienate the indigenous African majority from the running of the country's affairs to ensure that national resources benefit only themselves and not equitably shared.
Sudan's version of "sharia" divides citizens of the country into classes with Muslim Arabs occupying the dominant class and non-Muslim Africans at the lowest echelon of the social lather. Strictly speaking, non-Muslim Africans are only tolerated in the Islamic Sudan and are not entitled to shares in the national wealth. Officially, non-Muslims are even supposed to pay extra taxation for the protection provided them by the Islamic state.
Based on its version of the "sharia" the Islamic Sudanese state values human beings in monetary terms, with non-Muslim Africans, "the so-called animists", having no value at all and non-Muslim Christians valued at half the value of Muslims. The low human value accorded to non-Muslims does not permit them access to certain positions in government nor are they supposed to enjoy certain privileges. They are virtually regarded as second-class citizens.
Examples abound that provide insights into the level of state sponsored injustice levied on the African majority in the Sudan. If one accidentally caused fatal injury to another person, Islamic courts always impose a fine (dia) on the culprit payable to the family of the deceased. If, in such case, the deceased is a Christian, the amount of "dia" is half as much as for a Muslim, and it is zero, if the deceased is an "animist". Other examples of unjust punishment intended to terrorize the African majority are amputations inflicted for minor thefts. More than 95% of the hundreds of amputees since the "sharia" was introduced in the Sudan are from the African and non-Muslim circles.
Since independence, the Arab-Islamic governments have always over emphasized the Arab-Islamic character of the Sudanese nation at the expense of its predominant African character. The country's successive governments employed draconian laws based on the "sharia" to alienate the African majority from state power and national resources and to justify their enslavement and subjugation. This is the underlying cause of contemporary civil conflicts in the Sudan, including the current war in the country.
Attempts by the African majority to resist Arab domination in Sudan always met with vehement repression that, since independence in 1955, has resulted in the death of millions of Sudanese Africans. Successive Arab regimes in the country have always received immense support from the Arab countries, including Egypt, Libya and the others, for their quest to suppress the Africans. Did Africa ever really care to know where the rogue regime of Iraq experimented their chemical arsenal? It was on the villages and cattle camps of displaced defenseless Africans in the South of Sudan! Who are the poor, primitive black Africans of Sudan to care about? Not many, even in Africa, ever care to give any serious attention as the Sudanese problem deserves, especially since this might evoke the ire of the Arab world and jeopardize the precious oil market.
The black people in the Sudan are looking up to the rest of Africa to come to their rescue as Africa did for the Southern African subcontinent. African's collective political, diplomatic, military and civil society support to the liberation movements in the subcontinent helped to focus international attention on white domination in the region which ultimately led to the liberation of the region's countries from the claws of apartheid.
Surely, with the birth of the African Union, Africa is expected to be no more caught up in the sacrosanct charter of the OAU. Africa's eyes must surely now be on the lookout for ills in all African countries and to the fact that it is not only the white man who is racist. Arab racism in the Sudan cannot be permitted to continue any longer. What pride and prestige shall be accorded to Africa's great personalities? How shall Africa's great statesmen, politicians, diplomats, academics, business executives, leaders of global religious institutions, aspiring youth in African universities, and members of international civil society organizations, to mention but a few, be revered in the international arena, if they continue to turn a blind eye to atrocities committed across the continent even by Africans themselves. Africa ought to learn from events elsewhere in the world.
When a few years ago circumstances in the Balkans were degenerating to the kind of situations customary witnessed in Africa, the United States and Western Europe could not tolerate that the white-man was watched by the rest of the world in misery. The white-man's image must always remain supreme and at the apex of public opinion! Because of this, America and Western Europe intervened decisively to put an end to the atrocities in the Balkans.
The image of Africa as a whole is tarnished when human suffering in any of its member countries is relayed across the world. For the dignity and good image of all Africans, African governments and civil society have the responsibility to collectively take steps to end the atrocities being committed silently against the black man in the Sudan. It is, therefore, hoped that Africa will bring Sudan's racial problems to the forefront of world attention during the coming conference on racism and, thereafter, continue to work towards just and durable solution to all ethnic conflicts on the continent.
A View of Sudan from Africa:
Monthly Briefing 07-01
July 2001
The African Union
At a summit meeting in Lusaka, Zambia, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) gave way to the African Union (AU). Primarily an economic union, there are many who also want it to have a human rights and democratisation focus, encouraging conflict management and resolution as well as mutual accountability within Africa. These principles are enshrined in the New African Initiative, which effectively merges the Millennium African Recovery Programme (MAP) and the Omega Plan. In this regard Sudan will be a test case for the AU. Southern Sudanese are increasingly expressing their plight in terms of colonial oppression. Using that argument, South Africa was not the last bastion of colonialism on the African continent; that dubious honour lies with Sudan, where it is an Arab rather than a white regime which still denies the right of self-determination to indigenous African peoples.
Southern Sudanese face an uphill struggle. It is by no means certain that the new AU will pay any more attention to the needs of sub-Saharan Africans than did the OAU; the new organisation will still contain the same Arabised north African states. Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi of Libya is the force behind the creation of the AU, turning his attention to pan-Africanism after his attempts at pan-Arabism failed. His African credentials are dubious after the racist violence against Africans in Libya in October 2000, despite recent populist speeches and promises of financial largesse in Zimbabwe. GoS also has identity problems, having just agreed with Saudi Arabia to explore the prospect of military cooperation, and to be assisted in re-entering the Arab community after years of isolation following GoS' support for Iraq during the Gulf War. Colonel al-Qadhafi has stressed the need for the political discourse in Sudan to focus on the preservation of Sudan's unity, but conceded that GoS' call for jihad provoked Africans.
On the other hand, there is potential for southern Sudan to find powerful allies within the AU, particularly South Africa, which may find itself in competition with Libya for influence in Africa. Colonel al-Qadhafi was a close friend of the ANC during the anti-apartheid struggle, but South Africa's recent assistance in solving his Lockerbie problem may have paid off all debts to a former ally whom many would increasingly see as a liability. South Africa's strategic partners include Algeria and Nigeria. It is thought that the chair of the AU will be in southern Africa for the next four years (Zambia, South Africa, Mozambique and possibly Angola), which could represent a window of opportunity for southern Sudan. President Thabo Mbeki is known to have an interest in Sudan's civil war, particularly due to its links to other conflicts stretching through central Africa.
To capitalise on opportunities in Africa SPLM/A, as the largest and most important liberation movement, needs to enhance its diplomatic skills, but all southern Sudanese movements need to demonstrate their commitment to southern unity, human rights and good governance, and a clear and unambiguous statement of the objective of the people's liberation struggle.
Oil and Africa
South Africa's parastatal oil company, Soekor, has stated that it "is not about to enter into any agreement with the Sudanese Government" to prospect for oil in southern Sudan and that it shares "the concerns of the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference [SACBC] that an insensitive pursuit of oil interests in the Sudan might contribute to the escalation of the civil war." This follows indications from the South African Ministry of Mineral and Energy Affairs that Soekor was about to sign an agreement with GoS following a visit to Khartoum by the deputy minister. The South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs privately opposed the deal and the SACBC publicly condemned it. The media took up the controversy and it would appear that Soekor has, at least for the time being, backed down.
The following week the Sudanese Foreign Minister, Mustafa Osman Ismail, visited South Africa. He described his visit as "successful" but there are indications that the South African Foreign Minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, was uncompromising in her dealings with him.
Kenya too became embroiled with Sudan's oil. The new Energy Minister, Raila Odinga, announced that Kenya would purchase oil from Sudan via a little-known Kenyan company, Bahriya Petroleum. The Kenyan Catholic Church condemned the move and Sudanese women demonstrated against "blood oil". The Finance Minister publicly contradicted the Energy Minister. The USA intervened, reportedly promising investment in Kenya's energy industry if Kenya refrained from buying Sudanese oil. GoS also intervened, threatening retaliatory trade sanctions against Kenyan tea and coffee. The national press took up the controversy.
Raila Odinga has only recently joined the government of Kenya after his NDP entered an alliance with the ruling KANU. Presumably he is anxious to make his mark. However those who attended the recent Kisumu peace conference will be surprised at this U-turn by the NDP, whose spokesmen vigorously assured the participants of their party's support for the people of southern Sudan. But Mr. Odinga may also find himself up against vested interests within Kenya. Sudanese oil is zero-rated under COMESSA rules, which could make for cheaper fuel for Kenyans. However it is not universally welcomed, as it will mean less tax revenue for the Kenyan government and may also threaten the interests of establishment figures who own stakes in the Kenyan petroleum market.
Ethiopia is already buying Sudanese oil, and reportedly plans to obtain 85% of its oil from Khartoum by 2002. The recent events in Kenya and South Africa show how the potential market is expanding. Sudan's Kenana Sugar Company is also planning to invest in Kenya's Miwani and Muhoroni sugar companies. With its expanding oil-driven economy, GoS may attempt to influence it's poorer neighbours. African churches and civil society groups sympathetic to the plight of the southern Sudanese should be alert to this threat and be ready to respond quickly, as has happened in South Africa and Kenya.
Water
A recent Kenyan newspaper article, whilst respecting Egypt's unique dependence on Nile water, has nevertheless questioned the apparent veto that Egypt and Sudan have on the division of the water as a result of treaties signed during the colonial era. It argues that East African countries and Ethiopia also have a right to make increasing use of the Nile for the development of their own peoples.
Peace: Kisumu
A number of Nuer-Nuer meetings have been held following the Kisumu peace conference, although even the organisation of these meetings has led to some acrimony within the Nuer community.
Meanwhile the SPLM/A has issued a statement, through its representative to the Nordic countries and the EU, explaining its non-attendance at the Kisumu conference and denying that it prevented any private individuals from attending. Unfortunately those who have followed the process do not find its arguments very convincing. SPLM/A is under pressure from its external supporters as well as from many of its members to re-engage with the people to people peace process. NSCC and SPLM/A must work together to break the apparent impasse and move forward.
But perhaps the people to people process demonstrates a larger problem: the difficulty which the movements have in coming to terms with the slowly emerging civil society in southern Sudan and the other marginalised areas. The 1983 civil war began as a military struggle, and during its formative years was heavily influenced by Mengistu's brand of Marxist revolution. The political transformation of SPLM/A did not begin in earnest until 1994. While the people of southern Sudan are firmly behind the struggle against Arab oppression, they do not yet have ownership of the movements. South Africa is perhaps an instructive example here. The anti-apartheid struggle began as a popular struggle; the political and military components developed later. South Africa had a thriving civil society; southern Sudan didn't. The people to people peace process is not only a means of reconciling ethnic groups within southern Sudan; it is also an empowerment of civil society. Some within the movements welcome this as they are aware that true liberation will never come without the involvement of civil society, and that their very legitimacy depends on the people. Others are slower to adapt to this new development, perhaps even seeing it as a threat to their own influence. Empowerment, by its very nature, is the antithesis of control.
The degradation of civil society is also a problem in northern Sudan. In the past it was a potent force. Led by the professional associations it toppled two regimes by intifada. However when the NIF came to power in 1989 it created a highly effective state security apparatus and embarked on a brutal policy of repression and torture to break the will of the people. There is little hope of another intifada but northern Sudanese civil society still has potential.
Peace? The Libyan-Egyptian Initiative
There was a great deal of media hype about the Libyan-Egyptian Initiative (LEI). All northern parties have now accepted the initiative, which is hardly surprising, along with the NDA. However the NDA, in giving the initiative a "cautious welcome", set conditions which are unlikely to be acceptable to northerners. SPLM/A expressed through NDA its desire to discuss self-determination and state and religion. These demands are part of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) which GoS and SPLM/A have signed, and it is hard to see how any lasting peace can be attained without reference to the DoP. Even members of the GoS' puppet southern administration have reservations about the LEI because it ignores these two key issues. "I strongly feel that any initiative aimed at resolving the Sudanese issue cannot succeed fully if the problem of the south is not addressed," the Vice-Chairman of the South Sudan Coordination Council, Theophilus Ochang, was quoted as saying. Shortly after the announcement of the LEI "breakthrough", General Omar Hassan al-Bashir repeated his commitment to Islamic sharia and said that the National Salvation Revolution government (ie the current military regime) will never change. His government welcomes peace, but "without its price being separation of the state from religion or dismantling of the country or its cultural orientation." Some opposition groups, including the DUP, reportedly accused General al-Bashir of publicly supporting the LEI whilst at the same time deliberately undermining it. The Vice-President, Ali Osman Taha, denied any differences between himself and the president over the LEI. It is difficult to see how anything has really changed for the better.
SPLM/A called for the LEI to be integrated with the IGAD process, while SSLM/A issued a press statement denouncing the LEI as a "derailment" of the IGAD process, "violating" the DoP and failing to recognise "the inalienable rights of the people of South Sudan of self-determination." This intervention by one of the smaller southern factions also serves to remind us that there is, as yet, no peace process which involves all parties to the conflict. It is also worth noting that neither the LEI nor the IGAD process involves civil society; all negotiations for peace in Sudan are in the hands of unelected parties, both northern and southern.
Military
Aerial attacks on civilians continued, with NGO compounds hit and a number of deaths reported.
Major military action seems to have declined with the onset of the rains. Many observers are questioning why SPLM/A did not follow up its successful offensive in northern Bahr el-Ghazal with an attempt to capture Aweil and thus spare the people the misery of GoS military trains and their accompanying PDF raiders.
SPLM/A destroyed a second oil convoy in western Upper Nile. An independent journalist confirmed that there were Chinese amongst the GoS dead. SPLM/A claimed to have shot down a GoS helicopter gunship in western Upper Nile; GoS claimed it crashed due to a mechanical fault.
There has been virtually no inter-factional fighting in Upper Nile since the Kisumu conference in June.
Humanitarian
Geissan (Gizan), Keili and Keren-Keren are suffering severe food shortages as a result of the recent GoS offensive, but the rest of southern Blue Nile is reportedly not too bad. The situation in the Nuba Mountains is also serious, again mainly as a result of the GoS offensive. GoS prevents humanitarian access by OLS to both areas. Elsewhere in southern Sudan there will be pockets of food shortage. There will also be severe famine in parts of northern Sudan.
As of the end of June, funding for the UN consolidated inter-agency appeal for 2001 stood at 59%, according to OCHA. However, that statistic disguised a situation in which
non-food requirements were just 30% funded, while the food sector was 75% funded. The total funding requirement for the year was US$ 244.6 million. Among the items proposed in the under-funded non-food sector are interventions for emergency preparedness and response, health, nutrition, education, water and sanitation, protection and human rights promotion, reconciliation, resettlement and rehabilitation, and reproductive health. The UN has belatedly realised the need for longer-term programmes of a more developmental nature, but it seems that its donors are not so enlightened.
Human rights violations are on the rise in Sudan, marked by abductions, arbitrary arrests and the forced displacement of people, according to UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the Sudan, Gerhart Baum. "The situation now is worse than one year ago…. It is a fact that oil is fuelling the war… It is not a religious war. Religion is misused.... It is a power struggle." Baum said many of the human rights violations were happening under the cover of war.
The LRA is understandably viewed by most southern Sudanese as an enemy, supported by GoS and committing atrocities against the local people and international NGOs. Stray LRA soldiers do not receive much sympathy. However groups representing the parents of Ugandan children abducted by the LRA present a different view. The vast majority of LRA troops are children and should be viewed as hostages rather than belligerents. Many are trying to escape from LRA and return home, but the hostility they meet in southern Sudan makes it even more difficult for them to do so. Perhaps it is time for churches and NGOs to begin spreading a more humanitarian message about the treatment of these abused and traumatised children?
Nairobi
31/07/01
This is for background information only and should not be directly quoted nor attributed
The Sowetan (Johannesburg)
From The Sunday Independent (South Africa), July 29, 2001
"The Foreign Minister of Sudan: Envoy of Hatred"
By: Eric Reeves
The current visit by Mustapha Ismail, Foreign Minister of Sudan, should occasion serious and perhaps painful reflection for South Africans. For Mr. Ismail represents not just another African regime, but arguably the most repressive government on the continent. Moreover, Mr. Ismail's National Islamic Front, which rules from Khartoum, is a deeply racist regime, bent on permanently marginalizing or destroying the African peoples of southern Sudan---primarily the Dinkas and Nuers---as well as the African populations in other regions of the country.
Such strong words may startle many, but the savage conduct by Khartoum in Sudan's civil war fully justifies them. This war is the longest and most destructive in Africa. Over the last 18 years, more than 2 million human beings (overwhelming civilians from the south) have perished, and as many as 5 million have been uprooted. The UN's World Food Program has recently estimated that 3 million Sudanese are at risk of famine and drought exacerbated by war.
Sudan's war has many causes, and is not simply a conflict between north and south. Nor is the north homogeneous, politically or ethnically. But the geographical division is still critical in understanding other factors that sustain this terrible episode of human destruction. The Khartoum regime in the north looks to the Arab world for cultural, religious, and racial identity; the south looks to indigenous African cultural traditions, especially in religion, and is defined by the racial features of the Nilotic and Equatorian tribal groups (they are more "African," and much darker-skinned than the Arabized population of the north).
That the war has a significant racial animus is evident in many ways. Khartoum has for years abetted a terrible trade in human slavery, using as its primary surrogate the "murahileen"---armed militia of the Arabized Baggara tribes near the north/south border. Tens of thousands of human
beings have been taken as chattel slaves. We know this from the authoritative reports by the UN Special Rapporteurs for Sudan, from the research of Human Rights Watch and other human rights organizations, and from the countless testimonials of those who have escaped enslavement. Tellingly, there is a common Arabic word in the north for the African people of the south: "abid." It translates literally as "slave," but has the hateful connotations of the word "kaffir."
There are other measures of the contempt with which Khartoum regards southern, African lives. The regime has consistently used the denial of emergency food aid to starving populations as a weapon of war. It is doing so now in various parts of southern provinces, as well as in the Nuba
Mountains. Outrageously, the regime also deliberately attacks relief organizations that make up Operation Lifeline Sudan, a UN-sponsored consortium of humanitarian efforts that have helped to avert complete catastrophe in southern Sudan. Last July and August attacks on this
humanitarian relief became so intense that all aid missions had to be suspended.
Khartoum has also long engaged in the deliberate aerial bombardment of clearly civilian targets in the south: schools, hospitals, churches, emergency feeding stations, herds of cattle. These bombing attacks are carried out by Russian Antonov "bombers," actually retrofitted cargo planes
from which crude but deadly barrel bombs are rolled out the back cargo doors. They fly at very high altitudes and are notoriously inaccurate, insuring that they can serve no real military purpose. Their task---and for this they are supremely effective---is to create civilian terror and to
destroy the fabric of southern civil society.
More recently, Khartoum has extended its brutal assault on African civilians to provide"security" for international oil companies working in southern concession areas. An authoritatively documented campaign of scorched-earth warfare against indigenous southern populations serves to create a cordon sanitaire for present and future oil development. And though the oil is
extracted from the south, all Sudanese revenues accrue to Khartoum, which has boasted publicly of its military ambitions for these revenues.
Now that Soekor is actively planning an entrance into Sudan's oil development projects, these morally vicious realities force upon South Africa the same question that has confronted other nations with the opportunity to invest in Sudan's oil projects: will apparent economic benefit receive greater consideration than inevitable complicity in massive human destruction marked by an unmistakable racial animus? Dismayingly, Talisman Energy (Canada), Lundin Oil (Sweden), and China National Petroleum Corp. have chosen to partner with the Khartoum regime. So, too, has Malaysia's state-owned Petronas, which in turn owns the 1700 Engen petrol stations throughout southern Africa.
Foreign Minister Ismail has come to South Africa in large part to tout the benefits of investing in oil development, and to offer a callously selective account of Sudan's civil war. He is unlikely to dwell on the brutal realities of this war, or the fact that Khartoum's recalcitrance is the major obstacle to a just peace for Sudan. For its part, South Africa should consider very carefully the consequences of a parastatal oil company investing in racial tyranny and a brutally destructive civil war.
[Eric Reeves is an international expert on Sudan and a professor of English at Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts. He is currently on leave to write a book about the country]
POST-CONFLICT SUDAN CONFERENCE
Cambridge, 16-18 July 2001
Reported By David Nailo N. Mayo
Inside This Issue:
1. Introduction
2. Dr. Mansour Khalid Speaks
3.Brown Fox vs Black Fox
4. Conclusion --------------------------------------- >
I. INRODUCTION The Post-Conflict Sudan Conference was organised by the Sudan Civic Foundation founded years ago by Dr. Salah al-Bander, a Sudanese academic who lives in Cambridge for the past 17 years. The Conference was in memorial of Mr. Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub, the 5th and 7th Sudanese leader (1965-66, and 1967-69). The Conference was well covered by Arabic newspapers, including Al-Qudst, and Al-Sharq al-Aswat. The first day of the Conference was well attended. As usual the Jallaba (Sudanese Arabs) filled the room but with only less than a dozen Southerners. Of prominence were two former Sudanese foreign ministers: Dr. Mansour Khalid, and Professor Mohamed Ibrahim Khalil (the former was instrumental in the Addis Ababa Agreement while the latter was instrumental in the Islamic Draft Constitution 1967-68). Furthermore, there were Honourable Ahmed Ibrahim Diraige, former Governor of Dar Fur (1980-83); and Dr. El-Tigani Sese, former Governor of Dar Fur (after Diraige left for exile). From the Southern Sudan, we had some regrets: Dr. Francis Mading Deng couldn't come owing to an accident involving his son in New York. Both Dr. Peter Adwok Nyaba and Dr. Peter Nyot Kok didn't arrive. As the heavy weights from the South didn't show up, the few lightweights had to put a brave face and made the Jallaba quite uncomfortable throughout the Conference.
It was very invaluable Conference: we talked turkey, and those who missed, you bet you missed the opportunity to hear those varied arguments. Due to busy schedules, some like Ustaz Paramena Makwet could contribute only on the first day and left. But Dr. Deng Dongrin Akuany; Dr. Mario A. Awet and this author, were there throughout the Conference, and played all kinds of lyrics with the Jallaba. Ustaz Awet has an advantage as an Islamic scholar and well versed in classical Arabic as well. So when the discussion was tuned to Short Wave (classical Arabic), he was their with the Jallaba. Dr. Deng Dongrin wasn't only controversial, but brought personal experiences which were really touchy -- so he more or less acted as our big brother. We held our shields and spears firm facing the Jallaba(Sudanese Arabs). Elizabeth Ogwaro, though she missed most of the conference (as she came on the last day) nevertheless made impressive allulations befitting a Southern Sudanese woman when men are in the battle front. Contrary to her recent lamentation, "gali rujal kulu mutu," she finally realised that "Rujal kulu ma muttu!"
II. DR. MANSOUR KHALID SPEAKS Following an opening speech by Dr. Salah al-Bander, Dr. Mansour, a prominent Sudanese writer, diplomat, and a senior SPLM member, took the microphone to speak loud and clear -- as though directing to his own fellow Northerners. In reviewing Mahjoub's life, he was frank and honest enough to point Mahjoub's successes and failures. In praising Mahjoub, Dr. Khalid remarked: "In an occasion like this, we should be paying glowing tribute to former Prime Minister Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub … an acute literary critic, poet, and essayist. … and was the knight in shinning armour in Sudan's cultural landscape. … Mahjoub, the freedom fighter made remarkable contributions to processes of decolonisation, of ushering Sudan into independence and engendering vibrant parliamentary tradition. In this context, Mahjoub deserves our reverence and recognition." In denying him credit where due, Dr. Mansour recognised Mahjoub's shortcomings that: "Some of those strands in Mahjoub's personality were, to say the least, problematic. …. So in attempt to identify and perhaps, weigh Mohamed Ahmed Mahjoub's bricks in the building of the 'nation', we need to survey the background and political environment of the contruction site…. an essential requisite to seizing the meaning of the Sudanese paradox."
1. On National Unity: Since the Graduates Congress, the elites have often sought to construct a "united Sudan". To this extend, they opted for the creation of a democratic though excessively centralised system of rule.
2. The intelligensia saw the religions and cultural diversity of the country as a threat to unity and therefore strove to eliminate it (diversity). To them, Arabo-Islamism was assumed to be the sole determinant for national unity. Given the historical political and economic disempowerment of peoples in the periphery, especially non-Muslims and non-Arabs, that assumption was perceived by those groups as tantamount to racio-cultural hegemony. It is this paradigm that has haunted and continues to haunt the Sudan. Mahjoub was unflinching believer ….an articulate defender of the popular Northern strategy of the Islamisation and Arabisation of the non-Muslim African communities in Sudan in order to achieve uniformity.
3. On democracy, Dr. Mansour noted that the northern-based and northern-biased democratisation was "illiberality of epic proportion", even within the North itself. They cared less the contradiction inherent in democratic system they built and their inclination to obliterate "undesirable pluralism" and the effect of centralised-unitary "liberal democracy" co-occurred with complete unmindfulness to the concerns of the peripheries. Dr. Manour hereby indulge in historicity to prove that "Christianity in Sudan was of the older pedigree" than Islam. Christianity in the Sudan goes back to Nubia Kingdom: "But erasing millenia of any country's history neither does justice to historicity, nor indeed to rigorous analysis of Sudan's cultural evolution.
Those millenia witnessed the glorious Nubian civilisations which flourished when Europe was in darkness, [and] which radiated throughout Africa and which penetrated the North to Jerusalem." Dr. Mansour deplored the Islamists [in the Sudan] for foot-noting such long history. The Nubian Christianity as introduced by Bishop Longinius during the reign of Emperor Justinian, and survived 700 years, isn't a history that can "either be scratched out or unnamed". Here Dr. Mansour quoted the Acts of the Apostles Chapter 8:26-34. He criticised that: "This insensitivity to the Christian faith which is professed by a sizeable number of Sudanese, indeed, insensitivity to the very ethnic groups which profess that faith, endures up till today -- not withstanding all the mumbo-jambo of respect to religious pluralism." Dr. Manour referred to St. Josephine Bakhita who was canonised last year and respected by the Catholic community worldwide as a saint, except in her country the Sudan. [(Here, I may say I was deeply touched by the NIF's inhumanity to deny even the dead their rightful place of origin. For the reader's advantage, Bakhita (her name means the "lucky one" probably the only survivor in the raid) was captured at Algoznei village of the Daju tribe at the Dar Fur's border with Chad and taken slave)]. Nevertheless to cut a long speech by Mansour shorter, he turned on the Southern issue. He noted that Mahjoub demonstrated a great deal of insensitivity to the Southern problem. For instance, in his visit to the South in April 1966, he asked the Southern chiefs: "Do you want federalism?
Do you understand what it means?". Dr. Mansour saw this as a corollary to Sir Robertson who asked the northern Sudanese Chiefs in the late 1940s: "Do you want self-rule? Do you understand what it means?" Mansour recognised that the rise of the SPLA set the Sudan's politics on its head. And what happens when the war ends depends on how the war ends. But he felt that the Sudanese leaders need "psychological reform" which would resolve the political . He shunned General al-Bashir's peace efforts as "predicated on the destruction of the South." And indeed, the South has suffered exceedingly under a centralised-unitary state, especially as homogenisation crusade became a "hegemonising tendency", and for most the NIF has put the country as risk, the exact antithesis of a hegemonisation long pursued. He concluded with a standing applause from the floor
III. BROWN FOX VS BLACK FOX A key-note address by a heavy-weight is always difficult to raise unnecessary questions except to appreciate the balance of the address. But caught between the Southerners who hated Mahjoub's conspicuous racism and pan-Arabism, and the Jallaba who revered him as the symbol of nationhood, Dr. Mansour must of necessity be selective even though he leaned heavily toward liberalism. This was to be followed in the afternoon by Governor Diraige and Professor Khalil's additional intimate knowledge of Mahjoub. Dr. Deng's paper was read in absentia but towed the line of moderacy without pin-pointing the massacres Mahjoub committed in the South. I will return to this below. However, the world of academia and usual -- some justifying the Jallaba institutions while others opposed -- followed suit. But soon Ustaz Awet was to raised a point in which Dr. John Garang was described in the Arab press recently as a "black fox" when he left Egypt without clarifying to the Arabs the future of Egyptian Libyan Peace Initiative (ELPI). (Of course, many readers would obviously recollect the portrayal of a fox in Arab literature and poetry as very cunning animal).
Ustaz Awet retorted: "What about the white fox….? But before he could finish, the Arabs uttered in uproar "brown fox" (not white fox). OK, "brown fox", Awet accepted, "is it not true that all these nice words [in this Conference], seemingly sympathising with the South, can also be suspect?. There were certainly many Jellaba apologetics. According to Governor Diraige, the Jellaba many times, act like others do not exist, and if they do, they don't mean it in practical terms. Dr. Deng Dongrin Akuany, was blunter than he could be. He told the Jellaba how internal colonialism, racism, and exclusion has been the state-led policy in Khartoum. The Jellaba institutions are "racist" and even Jellaba democracy is racist and when split by taiffiyya (sectarianism) the more we get confused. Indeed, even a liberal like Mansour could say: "Mahjoub was neither driven by superior airs, not by contempteousness of the Southern indigene, in as much as [he] was influenced by a pervasive cultural insularity and land-locked vision that has shaped their life and thinking." Of course, I disagree with this assessment of Mahjoub as a victim of his time.
Would we say the same of General al-Bashir? Nevertheless, the discussions were to provoke the Mundukurus to rise. Professor Khalil rose to say: "For the first time, I now know that I am a Jellabi. I have always associated the term Jellaba with a merchant class. And I also now know that I was a coloniser. This brings in an element of racism to the Conference which started with an element of seeking the future…" Jellaba after Jellaba expressed the same view. One said let's be fair to the Southerners because Mahjoub represents a sad past where many incidences took place. This writer rose to say: "Do you want us to tell the truth, the whole truth nothing but the truth? (The room said Yes!). Well, we Southerners may remember only one Northern leader who is clean. That is Sirr al-Khatim al-Khalifa (the transitional Prime Minister, October 1964-May 1965). But the rest (from civil to military) all have blood of Southerners in their hands. Mahjoub, contrary to the praises here, in today's standards would be a war criminal.
And for you Dr. Kaballo, what you call "incidences" were not incidences but MASSACRES of Southerners. The Juba Massacre, The Wau Massacre, the Shooting of the Cathedral in Mundri during Sunday service, the Massacre in Rumbek, the Warjok Massacre outside Malakal, and the assassination of William Deng of Sudan African National Union (SANU) were all committed during the Mahjoub's rule. We are talking here thousands of mass killings in one attack. This is apart from what was known as "Fatur" where Southerners arrested overnight would be dragged out and executed in the public square "fi zaman fatur." All these are written, especially in Albino. If you are, indeed, scholars then you have to seek what you call "Al-Rai al-Thani" or the second opinion. This is important if we may ever listened to ourselves." However, the papers of Dr. Deng Dongrin and Elizabeth Ogwaro were very informative.
I presented my paper on "The NIF and Transition to Democratic Pluralism" which was purely academic based on "rational choice concepts" of analysing the possibilities when military dictators may permit a transition to civilian government. NB: The Conference organiser will put the papers in the Web-Site hopefully soon. But for audio, Ustaz Awet had done a phenomenal job to tape the whole conference: if you desire a copy, send him some money for duplication and mailing. In conclusion, I just wish the Southern Sudanese academics go to these conferences and participate. It was so pathetic that Cambridge is only one hour by train to London, and many Londoners (where the majority of Southern intellectuals live) could not show up. Where is the spirit of Liber-Action??
No To Sudan Blood Oil
The Sowetan (Johannesburg)
OPINION
July 25, 2001
By David Monyae
South Africa should avoid being drawn into the civil war between the Muslim north and the Christian south of the mineral-rich state.
In March President Thabo Mbeki said: "We dare not betray the confidence that the peoples of our continent have demonstrated towards us as a country and a people, that we will use all means at our disposal to advance the cause of the peoples of Africa".
South African foreign policy has certainly focused principally on matters that are critical to Africa's political and economic renewal. These range from the pivotal role South Africa played in the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU), the formulation of the New Africa Initiative (NAI) plan, the diplomatic peacekeeping contribution in the Democratic Republic of Congo and possibly Burundi and the daily contingents of our troubled neighbour, Zimbabwe.
All these efforts demonstrate the remarkable work the men and women in the Department of Foreign Affairs are doing to make the African renaissance vision the reality of our foreign policy.
However, the reported attempts of Soekor, the government-owned oil parastatal, to invest in war-torn Sudan, have the potential to retard South Africa's human rights centred foreign policy.
It is regrettable that the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs contemplates doing business with a Sudanese regime that blatantly practises slavery and commits genocide against the Dinka, Nuba, Nuer and many other black people in the south of the country.
Human rights reports consistently document the Khartoum government's daily systematic bombing of hospitals and mass removal of people from oil-rich areas. Because of its endeavours to play a leadership role in Africa and the global South, South Africa has a responsibility to speak out against this scorched earth policy and take measures to pressure the Bashir regime back to the negotiating table.
Perhaps South Africa should follow Kenya, the current chair of the Inter-Governmental Authority (IGAD) and a neighbour of Sudan, in banning the import of the "blood oil" from this genocidal regime in Khartoum. The move by the Kenyan government to ban the import of Sudanese oil has been taken even though Nairobi is likely going to lose its million (R1,2 billion) tea and coffee market in Sudan.
It is imperative therefore for South Africa to avoid being embroiled in a Sudanese conflict that has potential of engulfing the entire East African region.
Like apartheid South Africa, Sudan can be described as "colonialism of a special type" but the only difference is that it is the largely Muslim majority in the north that colonised the predominantly Christian minority in the south.
The greatest challenge for South Africa and other crucial players on the African continent is how to end a civil conflict in which southerners are increasingly demanding the right to national self-determination.
South Africa should work with other like-minded countries in the world to isolate the Bashir regime and sever all diplomatic relations with Khartoum. The AU should be the central multilateral forum that should denounce the enslavement of non-Muslim Africans in Sudan.
South Africa and many other countries have successfully built a culture of tolerance among different religious groups within their societies which Khartoum has failed to do. As it stands, the marriage between the northern and southern Sudanese has failed dismally.
Perhaps South Africa and fellow African countries should accept the breakaway of the southern regime as an independent and sovereign state. You cannot force people into a marriage that has never existed and continuously fails to work. Even though African countries perceive colonial boundaries as sacrosanct, the political situation in southern Sudan reminds one of the serious considerations needed for separation given the precedent set by Eritrea in the early '90s.
A clear message has to be sent to Mustafa Ismail, Sudan's foreign minister expected on South African shores today, that Soekor oil company cannot join hands with Canadian, Malaysian, Swedish and Chinese companies currently conducting business as usual in Sudan.
Regardless of the mass murder committed by the Khartoum regime, Canada, a country with a remarkable record in defending human rights and promoting peacekeeping around the world, is implicated in the perpetuation of the Sudanese conflict by allowing the Canadian company Talisman Energy to continue oil-production in the conflict-ridden country.
If Soekor's objectives of drilling oil in Sudan are met, South Africa would consequently boost the military muscle of the Khartoum regime to slaughter its people. Khartoum currently utilises the funds gained from the oil revenue and the infrastructure constructed by private companies in strengthening its military operations in the southern Sudan.
It is therefore imperative to put on hold any economic investments in Sudan until its human rights record is improved.
South Africa's foreign policy vision of an African renaissance does not allow it to play a double standard, namely, advancing human rights while doing business with autocratic regimes.
More importantly, Soekor's involvement in Sudan will ruin any possibilities for South Africa to play a meaningful role in resolving the southern Sudan conflict and will undermine our credibility elsewhere.
In spite of its lack of economic leverage in Sudan, Pretoria is in a favourable position to use its multilateral leadership to assist in rejuvenation of the IGAD peace initiatives started in 1993. South Africa also chairs the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Commonwealth, and also waits to chair the AU next year.
Martin Luther King's epic words, "injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere", should inform Soekor's management, the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs and all South Africans in general, before the first drop of the Sudanese "blood oil" gets into our vehicle tanks.
(The writer teaches in the Department of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg.)
Copyright © 2001 The Sowetan. Distributed by AllAfrica Global Media
By:Eric Reeves
The Military Situation in the Oil Regions of Southern Sudan
The Military Situation in the Oil Regions of Southern Sudan
The success of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in attacking the key oil facilities at Heglig in southern Sudan forces some difficult but important questions. How soon will the August 5 attack be repeated? What other kinds of attacks on oil infrastructure will the SPLA mount? (Exploration and production wells, along with other oil facilities and the southern reaches of the pipeline, are scattered over thousands of square kilometers.) What will Khartoum's military response be? How has the larger military situation in Western Upper Nile shifted? The answers to these questions are by no means certain, but the attack on Heglig suggests that an assessment is needed.
Eric Reeves [August 10, 2001]
Smith College ereeves@smith.edu
Northampton, MA 01063 413-585-3326
The collapse of a military presence by the Government of Sudan in Bahr el-Ghazal Province (with the exception of the garrison towns of Wau and Aweil, both now under siege) has had significant consequences. Perhaps the most important of these has been the ability of the SPLA to re-deploy forces and equipment from Bahr el-Ghazal eastward to Western Upper Nile Province, the location of most oil development operations. Moreover, recent SPLA victories in both Bahr el-Ghazal and Western Upper Nile have generated considerable numbers of new recruits. And the large captures of weaponry and ammunition have insured that these troops can be armed and fairly well equipped.
Logistical difficulties remain significant; but the SPLA has clearly advanced considerably in this area as well. It is also worth bearing in mind that the land on which this war is being fought is the land of the people of the SPLA: they know it intimately, and are prepared to use all the advantages of terrain, seasonal knowledge, local food and water resources, and the possibilities for military cover. Most are also extremely well seasoned soldiers: this war has been grinding on against their people for 19 years.
For its part, the Government of Sudan (GOS) has the advantage in numbers and equipment, especially in its Hind helicopter gunships. The SPLA has no clear military counter-weapon for the Hinds, though they did recently succeed in bringing one down. But the Hinds have no night capacity, and are of less use in the present rainy season (August is the month of greatest rainfall in both southern and northern Sudan). Until the next dry season, the light and mobile forces of the SPLA will have the advantage. Only all-weather roads are presently passable by GOS trucks, tanks, and other vehicles.
The SPLA also typically has the choice of where and when to fight---an enormous tactical advantage in the vast areas that comprise the southern oil regions. The GOS has been characteristically slow to respond to attacks except by helicopter gunships. There is no organized "rapid response" capability, tactically or otherwise.
Morale is extremely high among the SPLA troops, not only because of the successful attack on Heglig but because of the achievements in Bahr el-Ghazal, and a string of victories in Western Upper Nile. Morale on the part of GOS troops, in contrast, is extremely low by all accounts. The Khartoum regime would seem to be faced with the critical need to deploy many more seasoned troops and front-line resources to guard the oil facilities, but the question is where to draw them from.
The most obvious choice would seem to be Kassala Province in the northeast, the so-called "Eastern Front." But this represents considerable risk: opposition military forces of the National Democratic Alliance (which includes the SPLA) continue to pose a serious threat to the key road between Port Sudan and Khartoum, along which all supplies for the capital city must travel. There is also considerable risk that the GOS might sustain more embarrassing defeats (e.g., the loss of Hamesh Koreb for many months, and the successful assault on Kassala, the provincial capital).
GOS forces might also be re-deployed from southern Blue Nile Province, but that risks surrendering this key territory and possibly exposing the oil regions of Eastern Upper Nile (at Adar Yel). The simple fact is that Khartoum is already stretched very thin militarily; it suffered a massive loss of top military personnel in a plane crash near Adar Yel a number of months back; and its increasing supply of military materiel from oil revenues often simply finds its way quickly into SPLA hands.
What SPLA military actions might be predicted? Again, the SPLA has the enormous advantage of picking and choosing among its targets. There could be a shift to the Block 5a oil facilities south of Bentiu, for example (the Heglig, Unity and Block 4 concession areas of the Greater Nile project lie to the north and west of Bentiu). This is especially likely if Block 5a GOS military assets are re-deployed to the Heglig region. Very recent rapprochement between Nuer military commanders and the SPLA in Upper Nile Province increase the likelihood of such attacks (the oil regions to the south of Bentiu are predominantly Nuer). Increasing military-to-military reconciliation in the south may be the single most significant development in the war in recent years.
The SPLA might also choose to attack and pick off government garrison posts that are increasingly difficult to supply, gradually weakening the more extended GOS military presence in the oil regions. It should be remembered that the SPLA attacked the very significant garrison at Wankai (southwest of Bentiu) at the same time they attacked Heglig, and claim to have inflicted heavy damage and casualties.
The SPLA will also certainly continue to attack vulnerable convoys on the various roads in the concessions. They scored a highly significant victory in destroying a major convoy on the road between Mayom and Wangkai on June 8, but there have been other successful attacks as well. (The June 8 attack was confirmed independently by Swedish journalist Peter Strandberg, who was an eyewitness. Talisman Energy denied the SPLA account at the time, and has issued no correction despite subsequent corroboration by Strandberg, published in The Göteborgs-Posten [Sweden], June 26, 2001. This has obvious implications for the reliability of Talisman's present account of the Heglig attack.)
When will Heglig be attacked again? This was a difficult and dangerous operation. It may not be repeated soon; but then again, the SPLA has clearly gained a clear sense of the defensive perimeters that are supposed to protect Heglig, and has breached them successfully. If there are other weaknesses in the GOS defense of Heglig, we can be sure the SPLA will exploit them. Using automatic rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, and other armaments that can be conveyed by foot, they will continue to pose an extremely great risk to oil installations throughout the concession areas.
The level of destruction in the Heglig attack that has been claimed by the SPLA suggests that they have the ability to shut down the flow of oil entirely. This would create immediate financial difficulties for the Khartoum regime, which is now utterly dependent upon oil revenues for its military efforts. Such a shutdown would also, of course, have larger implications for oil development and investment in Sudan.
Each successful attack will batter further the value of GNPOC equities--a highly consequential problem for Talisman Energy of Canada, which is now clearly trying to sell its 25% stake in the oil fields. But even a sale with discount pricing must be approved by the Khartoum regime, and there are various signals that this approval will be denied under present circumstances. Khartoum does not want to lose the moral cover provided by Canadian corporate presence (especially having been so thoroughly rebuffed by South Africa on oil development issues in July), nor do they want either the Malaysians or Chinese to become majority partners, which would be the case were either to acquire Talisman's stake. The GOS will be especially reluctant to allow Talisman to sell its share in the wake of an attack that Khartoum still denies even occurred.
For all the confident talk of there being lots of buyers, it may be that Talisman is holding an asset that is both declining in value because of military risk, and finding fewer and fewer buyers for the same reason. If Khartoum does not allow them to make the sale to the Chinese or the Malaysians---contractually they have the right to do so---then Talisman is left holding the billion dollar bag.
No one should feel any sympathy for Talisman or Jim Buckee: they decided to enter Sudan against the advice of the Government of Canada, and against the advice of a variety of church and humanitarian groups. That they find themselves in a terrible quagmire, in which Canadian lives are clearly at risk, is hardly surprising. What will be surprising is if Talisman any longer has a clear exit strategy from this militarily threatening situation. Just as surprising would be a cogent explanation from the Canadian Foreign Ministry as to why they have allowed Talisman to create such terrible difficulties, for Canada and for the people of Sudan.
Pact of Umar (7th Century)
The Status of Non-Muslims Under Muslim Rule
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After the rapid expansion of the Muslim dominion in the 7th century,
Muslims leaders were required to work out a way of dealing with Non-Muslims, who remained in the majority in many areas for centuries. The solution was to develop the notion of the "dhimma", or "protected person". The Dhimmis were required to pay an extra tax, but usually they were unmolested. This compares well with the treatment meted out to non-Christians in Christian Europe. The Pact of Umar is supposed to have been the peace accord offered by the Caliph Umar to the Christians of Syria, a "pact" which formed the pattern of later interaction.
We heard from 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Ghanam [died 78/697] as follows: When
Umar ibn al-Khattab, may God be pleased with him, accorded a peace to the Christians of Syria, we wrote to him as follows:
In the name of God, the Merciful and Compassionate. This is a letter to the servant of God Umar [ibn al-Khattab], Commander of the Faithful, from the Christians of such-and-such a city. When you came against us, we asked you for safe-conduct (aman) for ourselves, our descendants, our property, and the people of our community, and we undertook the following obligations toward you:
We shall not build, in our cities or in their neighborhood, new monasteries, Churches, convents, or monks' cells, nor shall we repair, by day or by
night, such of them as fall in ruins or are situated in the quarters of the Muslims.
We shall keep our gates wide open for passersby and travelers. We shall give
board and lodging to all Muslims who pass our way for three days.
We shall not give shelter in our churches or in our dwellings to any spy,
nor bide him from the Muslims. We shall not teach the Qur'an to our children. We shall not manifest our religion publicly nor convert anyone to it. We shall not prevent any of our kin from entering Islam if they wish it.
We shall show respect toward the Muslims, and we shall rise from our seats
when they wish to sit. We shall not seek to resemble the Muslims by imitating any of their garments, the qalansuwa, the turban, footwear, or the parting of the hair. We shall not speak as they do, nor shall we adopt their kunyas.
We shall not mount on saddles, nor shall we gird swords nor bear any kind of
arms nor carry them on our- persons. We shall not engrave Arabic inscriptions on our seals. We shall not sell fermented drinks. We shall clip the fronts of our heads.
We shall always dress in the same way wherever we may be, and we shall bind
the zunar round our waists
We shall not display our crosses or our books in the roads or markets of the
Muslims. We shall use only clappers in our churches very softly. We shall
not raise our voices when following our dead. We shall not show lights on any of the roads of the Muslims or in their markets. We shall not bury our dead near the Muslims.
We shall not take slaves who have been allotted to Muslims. We shall not build houses overtopping the houses of the Muslims.
(When I brought the letter to Umar, may God be pleased with him, he added,
"We shall not strike a Muslim.")
We accept these conditions for ourselves and for the people of our
community, and in return we receive safe-conduct.
If we in any way violate these undertakings for which we ourselves stand
surety, we forfeit our covenant [dhimma], and we become liable to the penalties for contumacy and sedition.
Umar ibn al-Khittab replied: Sign what they ask, but add two clauses and
impose them in addition to those which they have undertaken. They are: "They shall not buy anyone made prisoner by the Muslims," and "Whoever strikes a Muslim with deliberate intent shall forfeit the protection of this pact."
from Al-Turtushi, Siraj al-Muluk, pp. 229-230.
---------------------------------------------------------
This text is part of the Internet Medieval Source Book. The Sourcebook
is a collection of public domain and copy-permitted texts related to
medieval and Byzantine history.
Unless otherwise indicated the specific electronic form of the document is
copyright. Permission is granted for electronic copying, distribution in
print form for educational purposes and personal use. If you do reduplicate
the document, indicate the source. No permission is granted for commercial
use.
(c)Paul Halsall Jan 1996
-------------------------------------------------------------
Return to Project Open Book
Sudan builds new weapons factories with Chinese help
WASHINGTON, June 17, 2001 [MENL] -- Sudan has built three weapons factories with Chinese help in a drive to halt the rebel advance in the oil-rich south.
A new report by British and Canadian organizations said the weapons factories were recently completed near Khartoum. The report said the factories engage in the manufacture of weapons and ammunition.
The factories were believed to have been financed by Sudan's oil revenues. Sudan is said to earn at least million a year from oil production in the south of the country. That revenue could double within two years if development of oil fields by Chinese and Western contractors is completed.
"It appears, rather, that oil revenues received by the government are linked to increases in military expenditure," the report said. "For example, the Government of Sudan recently established, with Chinese assistance, three new factories for the manufacture of arms and ammunition near Khartoum."
The investigation was conducted between April 8 and 27 by Georgette Gagnon, a member of the Canadian government-sponsored mission that visited Sudan in December 1999, and John Ryle, an Africa specialist who has focused on Sudan.
The report says Khartoum has deployed attack helicopters to launch attacks against civilians around the oil fields, developed by Chinese and Western firms, and drive them out of the region of the Western Upper Nile. Some of the helicopter gunships operate from facilities built, maintained and used by the oil consortium. A leading partner in the consortium is the Canadian firm, Talisman Energy.
A Brief Overview on:
War and Genocide in the Sudan
By Sabit A. Alley
Sabit Alley is a native of Sudan and a director of the Coalition Against Slavery in Mauritania and Sudan. Mr. Alley delivered this paper at "The 19th Annual Holocaust and Genocide Program: Learning Through Experience" hosted by the Institute for Holocaust and Genocide Studies of Raritan Valley College in New Jersey on March 17, 2001.
Introduction
The Sudan, located in North East Africa, is the largest country on the African continent with boarders that touch Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Congo, Chad and Libya. It occupies an area of about one million square miles, and has a diverse population of about 28 million people, comprising 56 ethnic groups, which are subdivided into 597 tribes. All of these tribes speak more than 400 different languages and dialects.
A colony of Britain from 1898 to 1956, the Sudan is a country of contrasts and contradictions. Its northern part is arid desert with no natural resources of any significant value and is inhabited by people who consider themselves Arabs and Muslims by race and faith respectively. Its Southern part, on the other hand, ranges from green savannah land to thick tropical rain forests with plenty of untapped natural resources including water, forests, gold, iron, copper and oil. Unlike the people in the Northern part, inhabitants of the South are racially African and predominantly Christian and traditionalists by faith. In a sense, one can justifiably argue that, because of these incongruent differences in geography, history, socio-economic levels of development, race and religion, the Sudan is two countries in one. One might also argue that it was, perhaps, due partly to these differences that the British colonialists administered the two regions separately until their hasty departure in 1956.
The North-South War
For over four decades now the Sudan has been engulfed in a bitter and devastating civil war between its Northern and Southern regions. The causes of the war are varied and complex, but generally they hinge on the North's hegemonic designs over the people of the South. Since independence on January 1, 1956 successive Arab and Muslim dominated governments in Khartoum have strived to forcefully bring the South under Arab and Islamic fold. These governments, and especially the current National Islamic Fundamentalist government, have used and continue to use war methods or weapons such as slavery, Arabization, Islamization, enthnic cleansing, aerial bombardment and man-made famine to either decimate or subjugate the African people of the Southern Sudan and Nuba Mountains. The National Islamic government has even gone as far as to declare "Jihad", an Islamic Holy war against the people of the South and the Nuba Mountains, who it considers as infidels and who must be totally eradicated or brought under the banner of Arabism and Islamism.
The People of The South have bitterly resisted this Northern assault by taking up arms to wage a war of resistance and liberation. However, in the 46 years of warfare, the South has lost over two million people-that is about 8% of the country's population- and five million of its population has been internally displaced with another half a million scattered in neighboring countries and abroad as refugees. The rudimentary socio-economic infrastructure in the South has also been totally destroyed as a direct result of the war. Schools, health services and transportation systems are almost non-existent in the South Sudan and the Nuba Mountains thus rendering two generations of children in these regions completely uneducated and illiterate as well as making the whole population vulnerable to all kinds of health hazards.
Slavery and Slave Trade
In most parts of the world slavery and slave trade are subjects that are taught in classrooms to students of history. However, in the Sudan slavery and slave trade are realities of life. In fact these obnoxious practices of modern day slavery and slave trade have never really stopped in the Sudan since the 18th and 19th centuries. They have only varied in intensity depending on who is in control of the reigns of power in Khartoum.
With the coming to power of the present regime trafficking in human beings has grown in capacity and intensity. As stated earlier in the preceding paragraphs the government of the Sudan uses slavery and slave trade as a weapon of war to terrorize and subjugate the people of the South and the Nuba Mountains. Undoubtedly, modern day slavery constitutes one of the most important factors that drive the genocidal schemes of the present Islamic fundamentalist regime led by General Omer Hassan El Bashir.
In the pretext of fighting Southern Sudanese rebels or liberation forces as they would want to be called, the National Islamic government of the Sudan (GOS) has deployed its regular armed forces and militia notoriously known as the People's Defense Forces (PDF) to attack and raid villages in the South and the Nuba Mountains for slaves and cattle. The PDF were created in 1989 by a presidential decree and they are trained and armed by the GOS. The government does not pay them salaries but has instructed them that their pay is the booty they obtain from the raids on Southern villages.
In addition, the GOS has trained and armed Arab tribes in the North with the express objective of using them to capture women and children in the South and the other marginalized areas inhabited by Sudanese Africans. In these raids the elderly and sick are usually killed on the spot and their food granaries set ablaze. The children and young women who are taken and sold into slavery in the North and other Arab countries in the Middle East are used as domestic servants, cattle keepers, farm workers, concubines, and very often given out as gifts. It is estimated that as many as 200, 000 Southern Sudanese and Nuba children and women have been taken into slavery.
The existence of modern day human bondage in the Sudan has been investigated and confirmed beyond any reasonable doubt by very credible human rights groups and individuals, academics, journalists, political and religious leaders. Just as recently as two months ago, Dr. Susan Rice, a high-ranking cabinet official in the then Clinton Administration, visited Southern Sudan and personally spoke to redeemed slaves. Not only did Dr. Rice deplore and condemn Sudan's state sponsored modern slavery and slave trade but she urged the United States Government to take practical steps to halt this egregiously inhuman practice.
Arabization and Islamization
With the departure of the British colonialists from the Sudan in 1956, the Northern Sudanese Arab/Muslim political elites to whom the administration of the whole country was handed, believed that the unity of the Sudan depended on the total forcible conversion of the South into Arabism and Islamism. To this end successive Northern Sudanese dominated governments in Khartoum put into place programs aimed at the Arabization and Islamization of the South and the Nuba Mountains. The regime of General Ibrahim Abboud (1958-1964) was notoriously upbeat on the implementation of these assimilative policies. Some of the programs to which he poured lots of funds included the monopoly of the mass media by the Arabic language to the total exclusion of indigenous languages and dialects, the exclusion of Christianity and tradition religions as evidenced by the decreeing and of imposition of Friday in 1960 as a public holiday and as day of worship for all Sudanese regardless of their faith, the decreeing in 1962 of the Missionary Society Act to restrict the propagation of the Christian religion and the subsequent expulsion of all foreign missionaries from the Southern Sudan in 1963/64; the forceful imposition of the wearing of the traditional Muslim dress, the "jalabia" and the compulsory circumcision and the giving of Arabic names to school age children as a pre-condition for entry into elementary and intermediate schools.
The current regime of Omer Hassan el Bashir has even exceeded his predecessors in the brutal pursuit of these policies of cultural and religious assimilation. Bashir's National Islamic Front (NIF) regime has put into place a very ambitious project whose aim is the radical transformation of many aspects of Sudanese political, economic, social and cultural life. Components of these NIF policies are found in their so called "Comprehensive Call" program which advocates the propagation of Islam, the saturation of all aspects of life with Islamic values, the spreading of the Arabic language and cultural values; and the repression of Christianity and African Traditional religions and values in Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains. Not only that but Bashir's government has declared the Sudan an Islamic Republic, which must be governed strictly in accordance with the out dated Islamic Sharia laws. As a result of these draconian laws many Sudanese nationals have had their limbs amputated for petty crimes such as theft. Just last month 19 people in the Sudan were subjected to these inhuman and degrading punishments. Their hands and legs were cut off.
By Sabit Alley
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